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Foreword 
 
EUROPOL 
 
I am pleased to present this report, which relied on 
the combined resources of Europol and INTERPOL to 
provide European and global law enforcement 
authorities with a comprehensive situational picture of 
the role of organised crime networks in the migration 
crisis. 
Europe is confronted with an unprecedented 
migration crisis in terms of the number of migrants 
arriving in Europe as well as the level of involvement 
of complex and ruthless migrant smuggling networks. 
Intelligence held at Europol indicates that more than 
90% of all migrants reaching the European Union use 
the facilitation services of a migrant smuggling 
network at some point throughout their journey. This 
is a clear indication that organised crime networks are 
profiting from mass migration. Europol has been at 
the forefront of supporting Member States in fighting 
the criminal networks that exploit desperate migrants 
seeking to escape armed conflict, persecution and 
deprivation. 
Migrant smuggling networks have proven flexible and 
resilient, adapting to law enforcement action by 
quickly changing the routes used to smuggle migrants 
to the EU. These routes are constantly diversifying and 
changing. More than ever before, law enforcement 
authorities have to rely on situational awareness and 
an intelligence picture updated in real-time that can 
only be provided through effective intelligence-
sharing. 
Migrant smuggling networks accrue immense criminal 
profits. In 2015 alone, these organised crime networks 
generated an estimated USD 5-6 billion from their 
illegal activities. These earnings strengthen criminal 
networks and have a significant negative long-term 
impact on Europe’s economy. 
Irregular migration is a global phenomenon impacting 
on Europe as a key destination region. To understand 
the impact of migrant smuggling networks on Europe 
today, Europol and INTERPOL utilised their unique 
capabilities to identify the modi operandi, routes and 
structures of the criminal groups involved. 
Europol has been able to contribute to this report with 
intelligence from EU Member States and other 
partners shared via the European Migrant Smuggling 
Centre (EMSC). Inaugurated in February 2016, the 
EMSC represents the collective response of the EU 
Member States’ law enforcement authorities in 
countering the organised criminal groups 
orchestrating the illegal entry of migrants into the  
 
 
 
 
 
European Union on a massive scale.  
Europol will continue to work with Member States, 
INTERPOL and other partners to dismantle migrant 
smuggling networks. This report will aid these 
stakeholders in enhancing our response to this 
unprecedented crisis. 
 
Rob Wainwright   
Europol Director 
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INTERPOL  
 
 
Driven from their homelands by instability, insecurity 
and poverty, the number of migrants flowing into the 
European Union over recent years has reached 
unparalleled levels. These tragic circumstances have 
generated both a serious humanitarian crisis and given 
rise to numerous opportunities for transnational 
criminal networks. As vulnerable persons set out on 
perilous journeys from across the globe – Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia – criminals are ready and waiting 
to exploit their need for assistance and their dreams 
for a better life.    
 
From illegal crossings at land or sea borders, to the 
fabrication and provision of fraudulent travel and 
identity documents, the challenges for the law 
enforcement community in countering the facilitation 
of illegal migration are numerous.  
 
In order to effectively dismantle the criminal networks 
behind the smuggling of desperate men, women and 
children, it is important to develop an accurate and in-
depth understanding of the wide range of illicit 
services they offer, along with their operating 
methods. In this regard, the joint Europol and 
INTERPOL analytical report on Migrant Smuggling 
Networks is an unprecedented effort to examine and 
provide insight on the activities, organisational 
structures, operating capabilities, estimated profits 
and geographical hotspots of migrant smugglers and 
their criminal networks.   
 
While Europe may be the destination for these 
migrants, the crisis cannot be resolved by police and 
policy-makers in the European Union alone. Europol 
and INTERPOL continue to demonstrate their 
dedication to working together to assist our member 
countries to fight these crimes, and it is my belief that 
this comprehensive joint analysis will serve as the 
basis for targeted and meaningful joint actions in 
Europe and around the world. 
      
Jürgen Stock  
INTERPOL Secretary General 
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Key Findings 
 
 More than 90% of the migrants coming to 
the EU are facilitated, mostly by members of 
a criminal network. These numbers are 
expected to increase in the future in 
response to control measures taken by 
countries along the migratory routes. 
 
 Although key migratory routes were 
identified as main corridors for migrant 
smuggling, they are fluid and influenced by 
external factors like border controls and 
weather conditions. A further diversification 
of routes is expected as smugglers adapt 
their services to increased controls and find 
new ways into the EU. New hotspots may 
emerge in response to these changes. 
 
 Facilitators are organised in loosely 
connected networks, stretched along the 
migratory routes. More than 250 hotspots for 
migrant smuggling are identified in and 
outside the EU.  
 
 Migrant smuggling is a multi-national 
business, with suspects originating from 
more than 100 countries both inside and 
outside of the EU.  
 
 The basic structure of networks includes 
leaders who loosely coordinate activities 
along a given route, organisers who manage 
activities locally through personal contacts, 
and opportunistic low level facilitators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Migrant smuggling is a highly profitable 
business, entailing low overall costs to run 
smuggling operations and persisting high 
demand for services. An estimate of the 
yearly turnover of migrant smuggling results 
in an average USD 5 to 6 billion turnover in 
2015.  The main means of payment remains 
cash. 
 
 Intelligence collected in recent months 
suggests that polycriminality linked to 
migrant smuggling is increasing: suspects in 
migrant smuggling cases have previously 
been recorded in relation to other types of 
serious crime.  
 
 Migrants who travel to the EU are potentially 
vulnerable to be targeted for labour or 
sexual exploitation as they need to repay 
their debt to smugglers. It is expected that 
these types of exploitation will increase in the 
coming years.  
 
 Terrorists may use migrant smugglers’ 
resources to achieve their goals. There is an 
increased risk that foreign terrorist fighters 
may use the migratory flows to (re)enter the 
EU. 
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Introduction 
 
The exceptional scale of migrant smuggling to 
and within the EU has triggered an increased 
number of actions taken at the international 
level.  
 
In 2015, Europol and INTERPOL reported a stark 
increase in the number of investigations that 
were initiated on migrant smuggling, and they 
have been confronted with a significant increase 
in the number of requests for operational 
support throughout the migration crisis. In order 
to formulate an adequate response to this 
unprecedented crisis, European and international 
law enforcement agencies require a much better 
picture of the activities of migrant smuggling 
networks operating across Europe and the world. 
 
The first Europol-INTERPOL Operational Forum on 
Migrant Smuggling was held In October 2015. 
One of the outcomes of the conference was that 
there is a need for an improved intelligence 
picture on migrant smuggling to Europe. It was 
agreed that a joint report should be the basis for 
operational and strategic actions on migrant 
smuggling to the EU.  
 
 
 
 
The objective of this report is to add new 
elements to the already widespread existing 
knowledge on migrant smuggling. In this regard, 
attention is given mainly to the analysis of 
criminal networks with the aim of: 
 Determining the networks’ structures and 
strategies; 
 Analysing their financial assets and money 
flows related to their activities; 
 Identifying the hotspots where networks are 
active; 
 Providing recommendations on key 
operational areas to target as well as a 
roadmap to enhance European and 
international law enforcement (LE) 
cooperation; and,  
 Providing an overview of future risks and 
threats.   
The key findings and intelligence gaps identified 
in this report were the basis of a number of 
working group discussions at the second Europol-
INTERPOL Operational Forum in February 2016. 
The results of these exchanges are reflected in 
this report as recommendations for future 
operational and strategic actions. 
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Migrant Smuggling Routes and Hotspots 
 
Europe has seen an unprecedented increase in 
the number of irregular migrants arriving in the 
European Union since 2014. The scale of these 
migratory flows reached previously unseen 
heights in 2015 and this trend is expected to 
continue in 2016. Currently, Europol estimates 
that more than 90%1 of the migrants travelling to 
the EU used facilitation services. In most cases, 
these services were offered and provided by 
criminal groups. A large number of criminal 
networks as well as individual criminal 
entrepreneurs now generate substantial profits 
from migrant smuggling or crimes related to the 
“facilitation” of migrant smuggling.  
 
Many of the routes used by migrants to enter the 
EU, whether by sea, land, or air, are not new. 
Migrants have used the Western Mediterranean 
route via Spain and Portugal for more than ten 
years. In 2015, a total of 7,164 illegal border 
crossings mainly by Guinean, Algerian and 
Moroccan nationals along this route were 
reported to Frontex. Migrants departing from 
Libya and travelling to the EU by sea often use 
the Central Mediterranean route arriving in Italy. 
This route is predominantly used by migrants 
originating from African countries.  Although 
there was a decrease of 12% from 2014 to 2015, 
                                               
1 Estimate based on 1,500 debriefings of migrants collected by 
Frontex and EU Member States in 2015. It is expected that the 
percentage will be even higher in 2016.  
in 2015 a total of 153,946 illegal entries were 
detected along this route2.  
 
From Turkey, migrants travel along the South-
Eastern route to enter the EU via Greece or 
Bulgaria by sea, land and/or air. Due largely to 
the worsening situation in Syria, the number of 
migrants travelling on this route increased 
massively (1,612%) in 2015 compared to the 
previous year. In total, 885,386 entries were 
recorded along this route in 2015. Migrants 
entering the EU via the South-Eastern route 
typically travel onwards along the Balkan route 
to reach countries of destination in Northern 
Europe. 
 
Migrants travelling on the Eastern route enter 
the EU along the EU’s external border with 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation. In 2015, 1,920 entries were recorded 
along this route with most migrants of Afghan, 
Vietnamese, or Syrian nationality. Finally, 
migrants travel along the Nordic route across 
Russia to enter the Schengen zone via Norway or 
Finland. More than 2,000 migrants attempted to 
enter the Schengen area using this route in 2015. 
 
                                               
2 In 2016 arrivals in Italy (from Turkey, Greece, Libya and Egypt) 
have increased significantly and it is expected that arrivals will 
continue to be high in the upcoming months due to better weather 
conditions. The Central Mediterranean route (so far mainly used by 
African nationals) may be increasingly used by migrants originating 
from the Middle East who wish to avoid Turkey as a departure point. 
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Favourably located along the routes, smuggling 
hotspots attract both migrants and smuggling 
networks. In and outside the EU, the analysis of 
geographical data resulted in the identification of 
around 250 key criminal hotspots, including 170 
in the EU and 80 outside the EU.  
Hubs offering transport infrastructure such as 
international train stations, airports and service 
stations for long distance coaches are key 
locations for migrant smuggling activities both in 
and beyond the EU. Smuggling hotspots may also 
emerge in areas with weak law enforcement 
controls or no rule of law as migrant smugglers 
rely on inadequate border controls and the 
corruption of border guards, police patrols or 
navy officers to facilitate their activities. The 
presence of diaspora communities can also 
determine the location of hotspots. Although 
major migrant smuggling hotspots are likely to 
remain the same in the near future, new ones 
may emerge in response to fluctuations in 
migratory flows, changes in policy or law 
enforcement countermeasures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Networks and Infrastructure 
When examining the structure of migrant 
smuggling networks, the information available 
would strongly suggest that migrant smugglers 
and facilitators are organised in loose networks, 
stretched along the migratory routes.  
Information further reveals that the main 
organisers are mostly non-EU nationals with the 
same origin as the migrants.  However, the 
networks they control would appear to be 
composed of both EU and non-EU nationals. 
Another finding is that facilitators who originate 
outside the EU and are active inside the EU have 
often acquired the nationality of the country in 
which they work, or have residence permits in 
those countries. Outside of the EU, facilitators 
typically support the movements of migrants with 
the same ethnic background. 
The basic structure of migrant smuggling 
networks includes leaders who coordinate 
activities along a given route, organisers who 
manage activities locally through personal 
contacts, and opportunistic low-level facilitators 
who mostly assist organisers and may assist in 
recruitment activities. Members of migrant 
smuggling networks typically work autonomously 
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with a number of lower-level contacts who are 
part of their personal network. Low-level 
contacts are used as drivers, crew members, 
scouts, or recruiting agents. The complexity of 
the network is ultimately determined by the 
length and degree of risks involved in the route.  
Cooperation among groups is usually based on 
need, particularly when one network has control 
over part of a migration route. Cooperation can 
also be more than occasional and make up an 
integral part of a network’s regular business.  
Although no fighting between migrant smuggling 
networks was reported, the high demand for 
facilitation services surely results in some degree 
of competition among groups.  Instead of violent 
competition, it is understood that a phenomenon 
of “oligopolisation” of the smuggling market is 
taking place, meaning that, in places where the 
criminal activities are largely concentrated, larger 
criminal networks will gradually attempt take 
over smaller opportunistic networks. 
With regard to the criminal networks’ “business 
model,” migrants may be targeted for 
recruitment or, conversely, facilitators might be 
actively sought out by migrants who are in search 
of smuggling services. Unsurprisingly, recruiters 
tend to be of the same nationality as migrants. 
Aside from asylum centres, the recruitment of 
migrants might take place in a number of 
locations which are likely to be frequented by 
migrants. Social media is also an important tool 
widely used by migrants and recruiters alike to 
diffuse information about routes, services, and 
prices. 
Corruption is another key facilitating factor in 
migrant smuggling. Categories of civil servants 
who may be susceptible to corruption include law 
enforcement and customs officers who are 
bribed to let vehicles go through border checks, 
and naval or military officers who receive 
payments for every migrant or ship they release. 
Given how lucrative estimates show migrant 
smuggling to be, it is not difficult to understand 
why perpetrators of this crime would be willing 
to part with some of the profits in order to stay in 
business. A rough estimate of the yearly turnover 
of migrant smuggling can be produced based on 
the number of migrants who entered the EU in 
2015: approximately 1 million people entered the 
EU, most of whom were facilitated, and who paid 
an average of USD 3,200 – 6,500 (EUR 3,000-
6,000). This would result in an average turnover 
of USD 5 to 6 billion in 2015. 
There is no single pattern regarding when the 
money is paid by the migrant and a smuggling fee 
can be paid beforehand, at each leg of the 
journey or upon arrival at the destination.  
Various payment methods are also used, the 
most common of which are cash and Hawala. 
Overall, it appears that money is sent mainly 
from destination countries, meaning that 
migrants tend to pay when they arrive at their 
preferred destination. Hawala is most widely 
used by criminal networks based in Turkey, Iraq 
or other parts of the Middle East and Asia. In 
some cases, migrants may have to spend several 
weeks or months in transit hubs in order to 
reimburse the facilitator for their travel or save 
money for the next leg of the journey. 
Although migrant smuggling is a profitable 
business, smugglers need to ensure that they 
manage their assets in a way that allows them to 
enjoy the profits of criminal activities. Depending 
on the level of sophistication of the networks, 
several money laundering methods are used to 
place, layer and integrate the money into the 
legitimate economy. Available information shows 
that smugglers are increasingly using cash as the 
primary means of laundering their proceeds.  
Couriers are generally used to carry large 
amounts of money across borders, either 
overland (e.g. concealed in vehicle parts) or by air. 
In some cases, smugglers or their relatives own 
legal enterprises such as car dealerships, grocery 
stores, restaurants, or transport companies which 
can be used to launder criminal proceeds and 
provide a façade of legitimacy for their income. 
The criminal proceeds may be invested in real 
estate, high value goods, and legal businesses in 
both the countries of origin and the country of 
destination.  Generally, smugglers adapt the 
methods with which they bring proceeds back to 
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their country of origin depending on the various 
regulations in place in their country. 
Legal business structures are also used in many 
ways to facilitate irregular migration. However, it 
is not always clear to what extent they are 
complicit in smuggling activities or whether they 
are being abused. Vulnerable sectors or 
industries include catering, hotels, transport 
companies, shops, barbershops, internet cafés 
and travel agencies. These businesses may be 
used along the routes to either support the 
facilitation activities of the networks (for instance 
by providing logistical support) but also to 
launder the proceeds of smuggling activities. 
 
Modi Operandi for Travel 
Facilitation services are solicited mainly by 
undocumented migrants or those who do not fit 
entry requirements, which leads to increased 
demand for fraudulent documents. In Western 
and Northern Europe, migrants make extensive 
use of public transports such as buses or trains, in 
which case they either don’t use facilitation at all 
or they only obtain fraudulent documents to go 
through possible security checks aboard trains. 
Numerous testimonies of migrants describe how 
they travelled un-facilitated between Italy and 
France and made multiple attempts to cross the 
Channel to the UK on their own before seeking 
facilitation services. 
Overland travel is by far the most used modus 
operandi, either to travel to popular departure 
points or for secondary movements. Sometimes 
parts of a journey can be done on foot, but this is 
usually limited to short walks to cross green 
borders between countries. In most cases, land 
transfers are carried out by car, bus, lorry or train, 
with some variations depending on the routes. In 
many cases, vehicles used by smugglers are 
registered with licence plates that are different 
than the country of residency of the owner, 
allowing for the links between owner and vehicle 
to be blurred in case of interception by law 
enforcement. Rented cars also tend to originate 
from a country which is different to where the 
criminal activity will take place. 
Facilitation by sea is used on the South-Eastern 
migration route (via Greece), the Central 
Mediterranean entry route (via Italy), the South-
Western entry route (via Spain) and the crossing 
of the Red Sea (via Yemen) or the Gulf of Aden. 
The most widely used means of transport in 2015 
on short distances was the rubber dinghy, which 
usually measures 8-12 meters long and can carry 
an average of 30-40 migrants. In most cases, 
smugglers do not accompany migrants during the 
crossing from Turkey to Greece. Instead, they are 
simply instructed on how to manoeuver the boats. 
Large vessels such as fishing boats or cargo ships 
may also be used on the Central Mediterranean 
route in combination with rubber dinghies. 
Facilitation by air is currently less frequent than 
other modi operandi but is likely to become more 
attractive in the future due to increased controls 
on land and sea routes. Air travel may sometimes 
be the only transport means used by migrants 
but in most cases it is part of a larger facilitation 
package which includes transport by land or sea. 
Facilitation by air habitually includes the 
provision of fraudulent documents.  Documents 
can simply be rented out to migrants for use on 
a portion of the trip then taken back by the 
accompanying facilitator once in the EU. 
Migrants may change documents several times 
during their trip, and the same documents may 
be used several times to facilitate different 
migrants.  To increase the likelihood of success, 
facilitators might also consider using complex or 
unusual routes or the booking of return tickets. 
 
Polycriminality 
Some of the suspects involved in migrant 
smuggling are also involved in other types of 
crime such as drug trafficking, document forgery, 
property crime and trafficking in human beings. 
In 2015, over 220 smugglers were identified by 
Europol as being involved in more than one crime 
area. Out of these, 22% were linked to drug 
trafficking, 20% to trafficking in human beings, 
20% to property crime and 18% to forgery of 
documents. 
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Intelligence collected in recent months suggests 
that polycriminality linked to migrant smuggling is 
increasing.  
Three types of links have been identified 
between migrant smuggling and other crimes: 
the first link involves the criminal actors, who 
may shift towards migrant smuggling or add this 
activity to their criminal portfolio. The second link 
refers to the criminal infrastructure, as identical 
criminal infrastructures or routes can be used 
both for migrant smuggling and for the smuggling 
of drugs or other illicit goods. Thirdly, several 
other criminal activities are operated in support 
of or in relation to migrant smuggling, for 
example document fraud and labour exploitation. 
From a geographical perspective, the smuggling 
routes used for facilitating migration are often 
very similar to the ones used for the trafficking of 
other commodities such as drugs, weapons or 
other goods. As a result, groups involved in the 
transport of one commodity may also use the 
same route and logistical means to transport 
migrants illegally across borders. The existence of 
common routes among commodities provides a 
natural incentive for groups to get involved in the 
trafficking of several commodities at the same 
time. Due to the peak in demand for migrant 
smuggling and other related facilitation services 
in 2015, some groups who were previously 
involved in the trafficking of other commodities 
seized the opportunity to increase their profits by 
also smuggling migrants. This would probably not 
represent additional risks for the smugglers 
because they are already familiar with the route 
and have countermeasures in place to avoid law 
enforcement attention. 
Criminal activities can also be carried out in 
support of, or in relation to, migrant smuggling.  
The most obvious of these is the abuse of travel 
and identity documents. Between 2014 and 2015 
the percentage of suspects linked to forgery of 
documents increased from 3% to 18%. A large 
variety of documents may be abused for the 
purpose of facilitating irregular migration. These 
include mainly travel documents (e.g. passports, 
visas), identity documents (e.g. ID cards) but also 
supporting documents (e.g. driving licences, 
refugee cards), “breeder” documents3 (e.g. birth 
certificates, marriage records, work and 
                                               
3 Breeder documents are administrative documents that can be 
used as a basis to obtain other identification documents 
fraudulently (Oxford Dictionary). 
residence permits) and fixtures (e.g. stamps, 
stickers). Documents of certain nationalities may 
be more attractive than others because they 
allow their holders to access certain services or 
benefits that would not otherwise be available. 
Overall, the increased controls and restrictions on 
travel and entry in some EU countries will likely 
fuel the growing demand for fraudulent 
documents and result in an increase in prices. 
The abuse of legal channels is another integral 
part of irregular migration but may not 
systematically be linked to smuggling. Migrants 
can obtain tourist visas on their own without the 
support of a facilitator, for instance.  However, 
once in the EU, they will likely get in touch with a 
facilitator in order to obtain documents that will 
allow them to regularise their status from 
irregular over stayer to legal resident. Schengen 
visas (tourist, work or study) to EU countries are 
the most commonly abused legal channel as they 
enable irregular migrants to enter the EU and 
subsequently abscond and stay in the Schengen 
area illegally after their visa expires. The asylum 
system can also be misused by those irregular 
migrants who do not fall under the conditions of 
recognised refugee status, in order to obtain a 
number of financial and material advantages 
linked to a temporary residence document. 
Marriages of convenience are similarly an 
important modus operandi used to gain unlawful 
entry to the EU, and especially to legalise the stay 
of those remaining unlawfully. 
Finally, irregular migrants are themselves 
vulnerable to exploitation by criminals and 
criminal networks both prior to and after their 
arrival in the EU.  They may be exposed to labour 
exploitation, sexual exploitation or be forced to 
serve as drug mules or participate in the 
recruitment and smuggling of other migrants.  An 
increase of cases can be expected in which 
women and minors, but also male adults, who 
may not able to cover the financial costs of travel 
to the EU will be increasingly targeted by 
traffickers.     
Migrant Smuggling, Terrorism and Violent 
Radicalisation 
With the continued migratory pressure on the EU 
combined with the recent terrorist attacks in the 
EU, there is a growing concern that illegal 
immigration routes and networks may be used by 
radicalised foreign fighters wishing to return to 
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the EU, or by terrorist organisations as a source 
of funding for their activities.  
The links identified by Europol between terrorism 
and migrant smuggling primarily involve the 
opportunistic use of migrant smuggling networks 
and their logistics to support terrorism related 
activities. Even though Europol has not received 
concrete data to suggest that terrorist groups 
consistently rely on, or cooperate with organised 
crime groups for their illicit activities, it cannot be 
disregarded that terrorists may use migrant 
smugglers’ resources to achieve their goals.  
Some incidents have been identified involving 
terrorists who have made use of migratory flows 
to enter the EU.  In the investigations into the 13 
November Paris attacks, it was found that two of 
the attackers had entered the EU through Greece 
as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria. 
 
Future Trends and Risks 
 
 There are currently more than 400 000 
migrants in Libya4 . Based on the overall 
number of migrants potentially heading to 
Libya from the Middle East and the Sahel 
region, it is estimated that over 800 000 will 
try to reach the EU from Libya5.  
 It is expected that, in 2016, more than 90% of 
the migrants moving towards the EU will be 
facilitated by smugglers. Within Europe an 
increase and change of facilitation services is 
likely due to the recent closure of the 
national borders of several European 
countries. 
 There will likely be an ‘oligopolisation’ of the 
criminal market for facilitation where the 
criminal activities are largely concentrated 
and larger criminal networks will gradually 
take over smaller opportunistic networks. 
This phenomenon is already visible outside 
the EU (e.g. in Turkey, Egypt and Libya) and 
may extend further. 
                                               
4 International Organization for Migration (May 2016) Displacement 
Tracking Matrix (DTM) report on Libya. 
5 4.5million refugees are present in MENA region and Turkey 
(Lebanon: 1 048 275, Turkey: over 3million, Jordan: over 636 482, 
Iraq: 245 022, Egypt & North Africa: 117 658). Source: EU 
Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, May 2016.  
4.5million people are currently displaced in the Sahel region. 
Source: The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA), 2016. 
 
 Polycriminality linked to migrant smuggling 
will further increase: 
It is expected that document counterfeiting 
will further increase as a supporting crime;  
Cases of human exploitation, especially 
labour exploitation, may increase especially 
in the countries of destination of migrants; 
The links between migrant smuggling and 
other types of crimes will remain stable (e.g. 
trafficking in human beings, drugs trafficking, 
smuggling of goods); 
 Forced criminality may increase in the EU, as 
migrants may be coerced into criminal 
activities by their facilitators. Unaccompanied 
minors may be further victimised, as they 
may be sexually exploited, forced to commit 
criminal activities, or else be involved by 
smugglers in the recruitment of other 
potential clients.  
 Overall, it is anticipated that the abuse of 
legal systems for the purpose of status 
regularisation will increase. Irregular migrants 
who have already entered the EU may seek 
to obtain counterfeit breeder documents 
(such as fake birth certificate or false work 
permits) in order to acquire residency in the 
destination country.  
 The demand for identity and travel 
documents of unlawful origin will increase, 
possibly with more demand for high-quality 
counterfeits. The market may also see the 
expansion of temporary lease or rental of 
documents which are used by migrants for 
one trip and sent back to the facilitators for 
re-use. 
 Major facilitation hotspots will likely remain 
the same in the foreseeable future. However, 
new ones may emerge on a provisional basis 
according to fluctuating flows, policy 
changes, or law enforcement actions.  
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Recommendations 
 
At the 2nd Europol and INTERPOL Operational 
Forum on Countering Migrant Smuggling 
Networks, the participants endorsed the 
following conclusions: 
 
1. The Operational Forum on Countering 
Migrant Smuggling Networks organised 
jointly by INTERPOL and Europol in Lyon on 
15 and 16 October 2015 and in The Hague on 
22 and 23 February 2016 has significantly 
contributed to the establishment of contacts, 
reinforcement of trust and enhancement of 
operational cooperation between the 
countries of origin, transit and destination 
affected by the current migration flows 
towards Europe, and the alignment of 
INTERPOL and Europol’s activities in their 
endeavour to ensure, within their respective 
memberships, optimal investigative support 
to law enforcement authorities fighting 
against migrant smuggling networks.  
 
2. As agreed at the 1st Operational Forum in 
Lyon in October 2015, Europol and INTERPOL 
elaborated a joint report on migrant 
smuggling networks affecting Europe. The 
report provides an overall intelligence picture 
by analysing the criminal infrastructure of 
smuggling networks, highlighting the main 
modi operandi used by facilitators, 
identifying hotspots for criminal services, 
analysing the financial flows and assets of 
supporting networks, assessing future threats 
and risks and proposing a list of 
recommendations for future operational 
actions. The intelligence gaps identified and 
operational key areas to target were 
discussed at the 2nd Operational Forum in 
February 2016 with a view to complete and 
finalise the report. The final report will be 
distributed to the law enforcement 
authorities of the member countries to 
support their strategic analysis and guide 
coordinated operational actions. An 
unclassified summary of the report will be 
made public.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Taking into account the findings of the joint 
Europol-INTERPOL report on migrant 
smuggling, in particular in the areas of illicit 
money flows and money laundering, the use 
of social media by smuggling networks, the 
link between migrant smuggling and other 
crime areas such as trafficking in human 
beings and child exploitation, tackling 
fraudulently obtained travel and identity 
documents and patterns of travel 
facilitations, the participants in the 2nd 
Operational Forum in February 2016 
considered the possibilities for concrete 
operational actions.  
 
4. The proposals for operational actions 
identified in the workshops of the 
Operational Forum will be refined and 
implemented by the law enforcement 
authorities of the countries concerned with 
support from INTERPOL and Europol. 
Operational actions taking into account links 
to other crime areas are planned to be 
launched within the framework of the 
EMPACT Joint Action Days 2016 under the EU 
Policy Cycle for serious and organised 
international crime.  
 
5. The launch by Europol of the European 
Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) in the 
framework of the 2nd Operational Forum on 
22 February 2016, following the European 
Agenda on Migration and the invitation by 
the Council of the EU from November 2015 
“to strengthen Europol’s capacity to support 
EU Member States in better preventing and 
fighting against migrant smuggling” is an 
important step towards strengthening the 
fight against migrant smuggling networks. 
The EMSC will provide enhanced operational 
and strategic support to EU Member States, 
including through the deployment of Europol 
Mobile Investigation Support Teams (EMIST) 
and Europol Mobile Analytical Support Teams 
(EMAST) on the spot, and in close   
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cooperation with INTERPOL and relevant EU 
partners, to other affected partner countries.    
6. The INTERPOL Specialist Operational Network 
(ISON) against Migrant Smuggling has been 
created. It is currently comprised of 86 
experts from 71 source, transit, and 
destination countries, and in close 
cooperation with Europol, with the objective 
of increasing the real-time exchange of law 
enforcement information worldwide in order 
to more effectively investigate migrant 
smugglers and dismantle the criminal 
organisations to which they may belong. 
Member countries are encouraged to join 
and make use of the network. 
7. The organisation of INTERPOL INFRA 
(International Fugitives Round-up and Arrest) 
Operations, named ‘HYDRA,’ to assist 
member countries in locating and 
apprehending wanted criminals involved in 
people smuggling, to promote the global 
exchange of information concerning their 
whereabouts, to enhance networking 
between fugitive investigators and 
specialised units, and to promote the use of 
INTERPOL Notices and diffusions. 
Cooperation with Europol will be carried out 
where appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Law enforcement authorities in member 
countries are encouraged to further improve 
the cross-border exchange of information on 
criminal networks related to migrant 
smuggling, and to make optimal use of the 
tools and capabilities provided by INTERPOL 
and Europol.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 14
Methodology 
 
This report relies on information available at or 
collected by Europol and INTERPOL as well as 
relevant open sources.  
The findings in this report emerge from the 
thorough analysis of a broad range of sources and 
provide the most detailed assessment ever 
produced on migrant smuggling. This report is 
unique in its blending of intelligence from EU and 
non-EU sources: 
 Over 11,500 contributions on migrant 
smuggling provided to Europol in 2014 and 
2015;  
 Intelligence on nearly 40,000 suspects, 
10,000 of which were contributed in 2015;  
 Over 1,500 international investigations 
supported by Europol;  
 1,500 debriefings of migrants collected by 
Frontex and EU Member States; 
 Over 140,000 communications from 2015; 
 Operational and strategic reports from 
Europol and INTERPOL;  
 Questionnaires provided by INTERPOL’s 
National Central Bureaus;  
 Geographical information (addresses and GPS 
data);  
 Intelligence on more than 100 suspicious 
vessels;  
 Social media analysis from Europol’s Internet 
Referral Unit; 
 Europol’s daily monitoring report on migrant 
smuggling (EPMT); 
 Reports from partner agencies (Frontex, 
EASO, UN agencies); 
 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A combination of several analytical tools was 
used to explore this data set:  
 A criminal profile analysis was made on 
10,000 suspects to define their origin, their 
roles within migrant smuggling networks, and 
their links among each other 
(communication); 
 A detailed comparative analysis was 
performed on a sample of 522 networks in 
order to determine their composition and 
structure as well as the profile and relation of 
the members;  
 Social network analysis was carried out on 
the largest networks to identify how widely 
they spread, how they are connected to each 
other, how the links between the cells are 
established, and who are the main 
organisers; 
 Qualitative research on 490 investigations 
supported by Europol was done to provide 
context for the findings of the 
aforementioned exercises and to provide 
case examples; 
 Geographical analysis was used to map key 
locations linked to migrant smuggling and to 
identify criminal hotspots. 
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